Chapter 6: Institutional Reform (Part 4)

The following time was for group discussions to review the “Draft Institutional Reform Plan,” the “Draft Regulations on Senate Discipline,” and the “Act on Relations with Naturalized Citizens and Natives.” Members of the Law Society and some senators from professional departments who had participated in drafting the documents circulated among the groups to explain the relevant articles and record any questions they could not answer.

These three bills were all closely related to the vital interests of the senators, and the discussions were relatively heated. During the discussion, someone raised the question of whether the Ministry of People’s Security, by controlling three powerful departments, would pose a threat to the Senate, as its head would effectively control all internal security forces.

“Such a concern is completely unnecessary,” Ma Jia explained. “If we look at the scope of jurisdiction, the powers of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, and the Japanese National Public Safety Commission, which we are most familiar with, are comparable—or even greater. But they have not threatened their respective political systems in practice. Moreover, the National Army is under the dual leadership of the Ministry of Armed Forces and the Ministry of People’s Security. It is by no means controlled by a single entity.”

As for the Ministry of Armed Forces encompassing both the army and the navy, and whether this violated the principle of separating military command and military administration, Dongmen Chuiyu’s explanation was that, according to the new system, the People’s Commissar for the Armed Forces would be a civilian senator, with a status equivalent to a minister of defense. The Army Department and Navy Department under him belonged to the military administration system; the Chief of the General Staff, and under him the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, belonged to the military command system. The military command system was directly subordinate to the Chairman of the Senate. Any order involving the deployment of troops and combat command had to be issued by the Chairman of the Senate and then signed and transmitted by the People’s Commissar for the Armed Forces to be effective.

Regarding the suggestion still being raised by some senators that it would be more beneficial for maintaining the “legitimate rights and interests” of senators for every senator to have “a foot in” the military, Dongmen Chuiyu’s response was as follows:

“In the TG, apart from the General Secretary of the Party also serving as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, most members of the Central Committee and the Politburo do not hold military positions, do not have military ranks, and do not require any military officer to be personally loyal to them to ensure their political power. The Central Guard Bureau is not their personal army either. Similarly, in the vast majority of politically normal countries in the world, including the former Soviet Union, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and so on… no politician relies on the personal loyalty of military officers or the maintenance of private armies to preserve ‘democracy.’ Even the Junker nobility, who had long controlled the army, the army was loyal to a collective, not to them personally. Whether a marshal or a second lieutenant, upon retiring and returning home, they are just a reserve soldier. As long as we always adhere to the principle of the Senate commanding the gun, and not a certain individual commanding the gun, the so-called ‘dictatorship’ will not and cannot happen…

“Feudal dependency has no place in the Senate. Whether it’s called retainers, eunuchs, adherents, or the British Empire’s patronage system, it is essentially a remnant of feudal personal dependency. Engaging in this kind of thing will lead to trouble one day! Things that have been swept into the dustbin of history cannot be picked up and worn on one’s head just because they have been given the beautiful shell of ‘protecting senatorial power’.”

In his heart, Dongmen Chuiyu was very disgusted with arguments like “dividing up the army” and “military officers must be personally loyal to senators.” Not just him, but the vast majority of senator officers in the Fubo Army were strongly opposed to this. Regardless of whether they came from a PLA background or were military enthusiasts, they all subscribed to the concept of a national army. In their view, once personal loyalty of officers was introduced into the army, it would create a situation of serving two masters, greatly undermining the authority of the Fubo Army’s command system.

What worried them even more was that those self-proclaimed “soy sauce” senators with persecution complexes were mostly incapable of controlling the army themselves. They would inevitably use so-called political maneuvering to win over naturalized citizen officers. And this so-called maneuvering was nothing more than a combination of grace and coercion.

Coercion was out of the question. Most senators were neither the founders of the army nor its commanders, and they had never gone through thick and thin with the troops. It would be very difficult to make a completely unfamiliar naturalized citizen officer feel genuine awe and respect for them personally. That would inevitably require a large amount of “rewards” to “show grace” in order to obtain their “loyalty.” To consolidate this “loyalty,” competition would likely break out among the senators.

This would first destroy the army’s command system. In order to win people’s hearts, senators would inevitably interfere with the promotion, transfer, salary, and treatment of the officers under their wing. The naturalized citizen officers would soon take advantage of the senators’ expectations, relying on the power of their senator “masters” to defy the orders of their superiors and violate regulations to seek greater personal gain. Over time, the absolute obedience and cohesion between superiors and subordinates, which are most important for an army, would be completely destroyed. When the day comes that the senators’ grace can no longer satisfy their appetite, the lessons of the Roman Empire and the Turkish Janissaries will not be far off.

“When these ‘loyal’ officers lead their troops to the gate of the Senate to demand more ‘grace,’ or else they will support a certain senator to become emperor, the senators will know just how beneficial this system is to democracy,” Dongmen Chuiyu grumbled in private.

But he couldn’t say these things. Many senators still held “rosy illusions” about their own “leadership abilities” and had a strong yearning for the “gathering followers” model of a “Long Aotian” protagonist. They believed that as long as a naturalized citizen was personally loyal to them, they would be an NPC with 99 loyalty who would do whatever they were told. Even if their loyalty sometimes dropped, it could be quickly raised again by bestowing more rewards… Shattering this illusion would make him hated.

“Fortunately, most senators are sensible people…” Dongmen Chuiyu thought. “Otherwise, there would be chaos under heaven.”

“Old Ma, since we have senatorial discipline, the work of the disciplinary committee should also be managed by our Cheka. Our department has always been on the front line of anti-corruption, with rich experience and professional expertise…” Yi Fan grabbed Ma Jia, his tone almost pleading.

“You really want to be hated that much,” Ma Jia said with a smile.

“For the great cause of the Senate, my personal honor or disgrace is of no concern to me,” Yi Fan said righteously.

“The functions of the Cheka have not yet been fully determined,” Ma Jia said. “But you can rest assured that the anti-corruption work concerning naturalized citizen cadres will definitely be handled by your department. As for whether you can also manage the disciplinary committee, that probably still needs to be discussed…”

“Rest assured, I will serve the country with my life, regardless of personal fortune or misfortune! I will devote myself to the cause until I die,” Yi Fan said, patting his chest to show his determination. He considered whether to reveal clues to a few major corruption cases, but finally decided it was better not to for the time being. When the authority fell into his hands, it would not be too late to say it.

There were also some who had objections to certain articles in the disciplinary regulations, such as the issues of engaging in business and “tou xian” (commendatory surrender). The business part was understandable; it was an opening for the senators’ family members. But the “tou xian” clause did not specify whether senators’ family members could accept it, and some proposed that it should be explicitly prohibited:

“‘Tou xian’ itself is a backward, and even harmful, phenomenon. It should be completely prohibited at the legal level.”

“It’s easy to prohibit all ‘tou xian’ at the legal level,” Yu E’shui said. “It’s fine to add it in. But one clause cannot solve all the problems, because ‘tou xian’ is mostly carried out through normal sales procedures and can be made completely legal. To nip it in the bud, it would be best to also prohibit senators’ family members from engaging in business.”

“Prohibiting senators’ family members from engaging in business is a bit too much to ask,” Ma Jia expressed his doubts. “First, the senators themselves have this need; second, the senators’ family members also need a decent way out. Not everyone can go into politics or the military as a cadre, and not everyone has the ability to be a technician or a scientist.”

Jin Zhijiao, who worked at the Cheka, expressed her opinion: “I’ve read some materials written by Director Yu. The main purpose of ‘tou xian’ is tax evasion. As long as we can achieve reasonable taxation that is not an unbearable burden, and treat everyone equally, ensuring that everyone’s enterprise or land is taxed according to the regulations, ‘tou xian’ will become unprofitable and risky, and naturally no one will do it.”

“No, it’s not that simple. Besides tax evasion, the motivation for ‘tou xian’ also includes seeking protection. This protection has two meanings. One is to avoid public and private harassment—this can be largely guaranteed after we complete our social reforms. The other is to use the power and influence of senators to gain more benefits. This is probably something we cannot completely avoid,” Ma Jia said. “‘Tou xian’ is a phenomenon that exists in a different form even in 21st-century China. If we cannot impose institutional restrictions, prohibiting it with just one disciplinary clause will not be very effective.”

How to impose institutional restrictions? Ma Jia’s view was that the influence of senators on administrative agencies must be reduced. In his view, this was the most obvious advantage of seeking refuge with a senator—yet it was also the most difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to achieve. The Senate’s administrative agencies relied almost entirely on the leadership of senators to function normally. The senatorial disciplinary articles already explicitly stated that senators were not allowed to interfere with administrative procedures by “writing notes” or “making calls,” and stipulated that all of a senator’s instructions must be archived in writing. But he was doubtful about how effective this would be.

According to the Law Society’s line of thinking, it was inevitable that senators would have a great deal of influence within their own departments and units, and this had to be tolerated at the current stage. The focus was on preventing the “cross-departmental” influence of senators, especially their influence on naturalized citizen cadres. To this end, the Law Society proposed an important argument: the Senate must emulate the emperor and create the impression among naturalized citizens and natives that “life, death, honor, and disgrace all come from the grace of the superiors.” Specifically, all rewards and punishments for naturalized citizen cadres must be emphasized as coming from the “Senate” as a collective, not from a particular senator. Through disciplinary regulations, senators would be strictly prohibited from intervening across departments.